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Abstract 
 This paper attempts to understand the behaviour of firms in cement sector of 
Pakistan regarding its financial structure decision. A typical firm will consider various 
factors before it adopts a specific blend of liability and equity in its capital structure. 
This paper uses four factors named as tangibility, profitability, size and growth. Panel 
data analysis is adopted to check the relationship of these factors with financial 
leverage for the period of 1999 to 2014. The results are explained considering existing 
but competing theories. It is observed that profitability and tangibility have significant 
relation with capital structure decision. These relationships can be explained with the 
existing theories, however, there was not enough evidence to consider any of the 
theories as superior. 
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1.1 Capital Structure 
Firms finance its assets by raising capital. Broadly, there are two ways to do so i.e., 
either to issue debt securities or equity. The major distinction between the two is that 
equity gives the right of ownership whereas debt does not. The relative mix of debt and 
shareholders’ equity is generally known as capital structure.  
Practically, there are large number of ways these debt and equity securities can be 
issued. It can take the form of common shares and preferred shares, long-term debt and 
short-term debt, and various other forms. Some of these securities can have a hybrid 
nature of both debt and equity. While the number of ways a firm can raise its capital is 
higher, a specific combination of the two can increase the overall market value of the 
firm. It is therefore probable that firms will choose a combination that maximizes its 
overall value.  




Theories regarding the Capital Structure selections are quite controversial. It is 
mainly because the factors of capital structure are complex in addition the impact is not 
always clear. There are three competing theories namely, the Trade-off theory which is 
based on cost and benefits of leverage, pecking order theory which points out a specific 
sequence of financing and Agency cost theory which focuses on clash of interest of 
managers and stakeholders. We will provide a brief overview of these theories here. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) are the pioneers of the work on financial structure 
decision. They believed that such decisions have no impact on the market value of the 
firm given that the financial market is perfect. However, when the assumption of 
perfection was relaxed Modigliani (1982) himself admitted that capital structure and 
value of firm is relevant. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Kim (1986) found similar 
results suggesting that there is a Trade-off between costs related to leverage and the tax 
advantage of debt. Pecking order Theory on the other hand suggests that firms raises 
its capital in a specific pattern. This pattern is based on information asymmetry. The 
well-known advocates of this theory are Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) provided an alternative theory of Agency Cost. They believed 
that Ideal Capital Structure can be achieved by reducing the agency cost between 
managers and stakeholders. 
 
1.2 Cement Sector of Pakistan 
Cement industry is amongst the oldest industries of Pakistan. Pakistan has huge 
resources of clay and limestone making it a very desirable place for the industry. At the 
time of her independence, Pakistan had an annual production of 0.3 million tonnes.  
This production increased to 0.66 million tonnes per year against the demand of 1 
million per year by 1954. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) 
established some new plants named as maple leaf and Zealpak with the production 
capacity of 0.24 and 0.1 million tonnes per year.  
In 1927 the first cement plant was established at Wah. Later in 1947 at the time of 
independence four new plants were established. By 1956 the number increased to six 
plants. In 1972 State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (SCCP) was established which 
brought the whole industry under the government control. They established five new 
plants but made no investments in the next fifteen years. Consequently, the industry 
faced severe shortage in late seventies and early eighties. Just before privatizing in 
1991, seven new plants were established. After privatization eight more plants were 
added to the industry. New techniques were introduced such as dry processing. The 
industry flourished once again. At present, there are 25 cement firms with the capacity 
of 19.5 million tons per annum. 
 




2.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Our focus in this research is to understand the behavior of Cement firms regarding 
financial structure in Pakistani environment. Booth et al (2001) analyzed firms from 
Pakistan along with 9 other developing countries. But his study was restricted to 96 
highly capitalized firms selected from KSE-100 index. Furthermore, his study was not 
restricted to a specific industry. We focus our study on Cement sector only because of 
its importance and contribution to GDP of Pakistan. Secondly, capital decisions vary 
from industry to industry (Boateng, 2004). Therefore, by choosing cement sector we 
will keep the industry wise variation constant. The study may help managers choose 
appropriate level of debt against equity which can increase the value of firm, hence 
contributing to GDP of Pakistan. 
Our research questions for the study can be summarized as: 
1. How is capital structure changing over time in cement sector of Pakistan? 
2. What determines the changes in capital structure in cement Sector of Pakistan? 
3. How various theories of capital structure explain these determinants 
 
3.     LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initiated the work on firms’ financial structure. They 
believed that firms’ value cannot be changed by changing the level of leverage. 
However, this theory was strictly based on the assumptions of perfect capital market. 
Practically, managers do not treat debt and equity equally. This difference between 
theory and practice made Modigliani and Miller (1963) re-consider their preposition. 
They included the impact of corporate tax into their model. The new MM preposition 
suggested that increase in debt as compared to equity results in higher firm value since 
equity is taxed twice. Yet the firms are never 100% leveraged because of bankruptcy 
cost. The study of Donaldson (1961) suggested that firms have preferences. Firms 
prefer to finance from retained earnings or internal finances as opposed to debt or 
external financing. Since lesser information must be made public. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) under the same assumptions but without taxes, 
reached to the conclusion that firms value has no relevance to the way it raises its 
finances. However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) later acknowledged that leveraging a 
firm through debt has advantage in regard to the way firms are taxed, since firms do 
not pay tax on debt whereas shareholders income is taxed twice. 
Debt on the other hand has its own perils. Financial distress in general words means 
that a firm is unable to pay its debt holder. Higher the value of leverage the higher is 
the chance of bankruptcy. Thus, higher debt levels are harmful for both shareholders 
and debt holders. This risk of incurring the cost of bankruptcy offsets the tax advantage 




on borrowing. Megginson et al (2007) described that bankruptcy cost can have two 
forms; these costs can either be direct or indirect. Indirect costs do not involve cash but 
are linked with bankruptcy like the loss of sales, manager’s time and key employees. 
These costs are not easily measurable, but they are significant in comparison to direct 
costs. Warner (1977) conducted a research based on 11 railroads. He concluded that 
these costs are not much significant. Altman (1984) however believed that Warner’s 
bankruptcy costs are narrowly defined. He found strong evidence that the costs are very 
high. Based on this discussion one can safely conclude that firms that are more 
leveraged comes with advantage of tax shield on one hand and disadvantage of 
bankruptcy cost and financial distress on the other. Managers face a trade-off between 
tax shield and cost of financial distress. This indicates that firms can reach an optimal 
level by choosing from both debt and equity. 
There are several studies supporting the trade-off theory. Graham and Harvey 
(2001) studied the responses of 392 chief financial officers on the cost of capital, capital 
structure and capital budgeting. His results were moderately in favor of trade-off 
theory. Marsh (1982) concluded that businesses have a targeted level of debt in mind 
and that these levels depend on bankruptcy risks and asset compositions.  
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) studied the performance of 20 years’ firms 
leverage ratios using cross-sectional data of 851 firms. He found that behavior of firms 
regarding its capital structure in industries is similar. Another significant result in his 
study was that earning volatility and leverage were inversely related. Wald (1999) 
conducted a comparative study for various countries. He correlated factors based on 
trade-off model like, profitability, size, riskiness and growth. His results were in favor 
of trade-off model. 
There are some studies like Titman and Wessel (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Fama and French (2002) and Wald (1999) who showed that most profitable firms are 
inclined to borrow less which is against what the trade-off theory suggests. 
The “pecking order theory” believes that businesses follow a specific sequence 
while financing its capital structure. Its origin can be drawn to the study of Donaldson 
(1961). In his study, he pointed out that firms prefer internal financing to debt financing. 
Firms will finance its new investments initially from its retained earnings. If there are 
no adequate retained earning they will prefer to finance with debt and will go to equity 
in the last. This is mainly because that the firms do not want to disclose its business 
information which they had to make public more in case of equity then in case of debt. 
Pecking order theory can describe the negative relation of profitability with 
leverage. Firms with higher profits will have higher retained earnings to finance from 
and thus no need for external financing. Less profitable firms are expected to borrow 
more. 




Pecking order theory assumes that managers always work in the best interest of 
shareholders. In real world, this assumption does not hold. Managers work for their 
own interests whereas, shareholders search for their own benefits. The effort required 
to minimize this conflict is called agency cost. Agency costs made several economists 
review their work. Donaldson (1969) agrees that manager’s decision regarding capital 
structure does not necessarily maximize shareholder’s wealth. 
Berle and Means (1932), Berle (1954), Myer and Maljuf (1984) believes that the 
pecking order theory fails to provide an appropriate explanation of capital structure. 
Myers (1984) provides plenty of examples where firms issue common stock instead of 
debt. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting that internal 
financing is always inadequate to cover investment spending Therefore; firms must go 
for external financing. The role of agency cost becomes significant because both 
pecking order theory and trade off theory fails to explain the financing behavior. 
“Agency costs are as real as any other cost” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These 
conflicting theories go side by side and we have no complete evidence in support of 
any one theory. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
After a detailed discussion on previous literature we discuss here the methodology 
that has been adopted for the study. We have used panel data analysis to understand the 
significance and correlation of different variables. These variables are discussed in 
detail below: 
 
4.1 Dependent variable: Leverage 
Studies suggest level of leverage depends on how leverage is defined. Market based 
leverage can be calculated as book value of debt divided by book value of debt and 
market value of equity. Book value of leverage considers book value of equity instead. 
In mathematical form, we write it as: 








Whereas Lm is market-based leverage and Lb is book value-based leverage. Db and Eb 
are book values of debt and equity respectively while Em represents market value of 
equity. Several studies like Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988) used 
both these values. We use book value of leverage because of lack of market data in 
Pakistan. Secondly, book value of leverage provides a relative ease of calculation. We 




also focus on total debt instead of long term debt because the major source of debt in 
Pakistan are commercial banks which discourages long term financing in Pakistan 
(Booth et al (2001), Shah and Shah et al., (2004)) 
We write our leverage ratio as 




Whereas Lb is the variable for our leverage, Db represents total debt and Eb represents 
total equity. 
4.2 Independent variable 
4.2.1 Tangibility of Assets 
Tangibility of assets Tg can be measured as a ratio of Fixed Assets Fa to total 
Assets Ta. We can write it in mathematical form as 




Trade-off theory suggests that firms with high level of tangible assets are in 
position to provide collateral for debt. Firms with high level of tangible assets have 
lower chances of bankruptcy. Thus, it provides incentive for mangers to borrow instead 
of issuing common stocks. Studies like that of Titman and Wessels (1988) found 
positive relationship between leverage and tangibility. However, the results are not so 
clear for developing countries.  
Pecking order theory also suggests a positive relationship. Myers (1984) argues 
financing with debt backed by collateral may decrease the asymmetric information 
related costs in financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that collateralized debt 
reduces the chances of agency cost of debt. Um (2001) suggests that with low level of 




In most of the studies Size Sz is taken in one of the two forms. Some researchers 
have taken natural log of sales, since firms that are large will have more sales. Others 
have defined it as a natural log of total assets which is also true because bigger firms 
have more assets. Few of the studies have taken size measure based on number of 
employees, book value of equity and market value of equity. Our contribution to this 
research here is that we will use a composite index using Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA). PCA measure is used to assign weights to Index. PCA which is a robust and 
statistical way to identify the weights of the components in the formation of an index. 




We use this Indexed measure mainly because studies have shown that sales and total 
assets are uncorrelated. We can eliminate biasness towards any of these measures by 
averaging them. As for as values of equity are concerned they are highly correlated 
with total assets. While in Pakistan number of employees is not reported by firms.  
Trade-off theory proposes that bigger firms have the capacity to hold more debt. 
Large firms are regarded as “too big to fail” (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). Due to higher 
debt capacity, trade-off model suggests a positive direct relation between leverage and 
size. 
4.2.3 Growth of Firm 
We define growth as change in size 




Based on pecking order theory, Um (2001) suggests that growing firms have higher 
investment opportunities. Retained earnings are normally not enough to finance these 
investments. Therefore, growing firms are expected to borrow more. Booth et al (2001) 
showed positive relationship for all countries in his sample except for Pakistan and 
South Korea. This negative relationship in Pakistan might be true because of the use of 
short term debt. Agency cost theory advocates that the using short term liability can 
reduce the agency problems as any effort by managers to extract wealth from lenders 
might reduce the chance of borrowing in the future. 
 
4.2.4 Profitability 
We define profitability Pr by dividing net income after taxes Ni by the value of 
total assets Ta 




Trade-off theory suggests that profitability increases the debt capacity of firms. 
Thus, they are positively related (Um, 2001). Whereas, pecking order theory points out 
that companies prefer internal funding to debt funding. Higher profitability means 
higher level of internal resources (Myers 1984). There will be little need for external 
financing which implies an inverse relation between profitability and leverage.  
4.3 Model Specification 
The study uses secondary data and the population of the study consist all listed 
firms of cement Industry in Pakistan. Data is taken from State Bank of Pakistan’s 
Publications (Financial Statements analysis of companies listed at Karachi Stock 
Exchange) for the period of 1999 to 2014 
To observe how these determinants, affect the level of leverage we use Panel data 
analysis. 





4.3.1 Static Model 
The Static model that is most commonly used for the behavior of capital structure 
is formulated as 
𝐿𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑔𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡 






















Endogenous variable Lb represents leverage which depends on tangibility Tg, Size 
Sz, Growth Gr and Profitability Pr. Here Db stands for total debt, Ta stands for total 
assets, Fa for fixed Assets. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
We took a total number of fourteen firms for this analysis. The rest were excluded 
either because of missing or unreliable data. The time period in consideration is from 
1999 to 2014.This gives us a total of 224 observations. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
These statistics enables us to understand the main properties of the data. We have 
shown descriptive statistics for all our variables used in this study. We have a total of 
210 observations for each variable. The normal range for Leverage is 0 to 1 but there 
is only a single observation of leverage where the value is greater than 1. This value is 
of Fauji Cement for year 2001 where firm was continuously making losses to the point 
where reserves were in negative and firm was overly financed. All other observations 
or the variable are in the range of 0 to 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for variables     
 Leverage Profitability Tangibility Growth Total Assets Sales 
Mean 0.552931 0.05756 0.723038 0.092455 12636778 6468974 
Median 0.561924 0.029047 0.75486 0.054728 6415828 3566678 
Maximum 1.037685 0.532343 0.976685 0.628479 88016062 81148219 
Minimum 0.14687 -0.21497 0.156791 -0.31917 816700 1 
Std. Dev. 0.188704 0.108627 0.156427 0.158648 15025026 8749639 
Skewness 0.001701 0.978008 -0.75273 0.926451 2.189173 4.443916 
Kurtosis 2.556829 4.632845 3.373412 4.050809 8.359104 31.96587 
Sum 116.1154 12.08756 151.838 19.41563 2.65E+09 1.36E+09 
Sum Sq. Dev. 7.442344 2.466142 5.114111 5.260351 4.72E+16 1.60E+16 





      Many firms were making losses during the observed period, so negative value of 
profitability is normal for the data. Sales and total assets are used to build our variable 
of size. Growth is calculated as a percentage change in total assets. Due to calculation 
of growth involving lag periods we therefore have sacrificed observations of one 
period. The minimum value of sales is 0 for firms who stopped sales. 
 
5.2 Firm Size 
      Firm size is calculated as an index of two variables. These variables are total assets 
and total Sales. We use Principal Component analysis to derive our measure. For this 
purpose, we select the principal component with the highest eigenvalue. We chose first 
component which has eigenvalue of 1.83 and thus eigenvectors for the corresponding 
components are both equal with the value of 0.7. Which when squared gives us weights 
of 0.5. Thus, while creating the index for size both variables, that is ‘total assets’ and 
‘total sales’ will have weights of 0.5. This is because of the high correlation that exists 
among these two measures. 
 
Table 2: Principle Component Analysis for Total Sales and Total Assets 
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 2, Average = 1)     
        Cumulative Cumulative 
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion 
1 1.827381 1.654761 0.9137 1.827381 0.9137 
2 0.172619 ---     0.0863 2 1 
Eigenvectors (loadings):        
Variable PC 1   PC 2         
SL 0.707107 -0.707107       
TA 0.707107 0.707107       
Ordinary correlations:       
  SL TA       
SL 1  0.827381       
TA 0.827381 1       
Based on this discussion our size variable is calculated as 
𝑆𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 0.5𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑡) + 0.5𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑡)  
Ln indicating natural logs implying that the variable is transformed into natural log 
form. 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 





5.3 Industrial Trend of variables 
We also need to understand how our variables change over time, most importantly 
how the leverage is changing over time. For this purpose, we have averaged firm values 
for each period and compared the values with other periods with the help of line graph. 
The result shows that Leverage has been decreasing over time. For example, in 1999 
average leverage ratio for a cement firm was 61 percent, while it has dropped to 38 
percent in 2014.  
 
 
Figure 1. Trend of leverage, tangibility and profitability over time in cement industry 
      It is also worthy to note that this drop has significantly occurred in the last five 
periods of the study. During this period a significant change has also occurred in 
profitability as well. There might be structural changes responsible for such a shift as 
well. For example, pari-passu loans now restrict firm’s up to a certain level of leverage. 
This also indicates the presence of agency cost. It is also observed that tangibility has 
been decreasing over time. This might also be causing the overall decrease in leverage. 
 
5.4 Static Model Analysis 
The Static model that is most commonly used for the behavior of capital structure 
is formulated as 















Industrial trend over time
lev tan pr




Since we are using panel data for this analysis we can estimate the model with three 
possible techniques. (a) general constant method, (b) Fixed effect method and (c) 
Random effect method. 
The common constant method assumes that the constant term 𝛼 is the same for all 
the cross-sectional units across the data. In our case these cross-sectional units are the 
cement firms which as per the technique should be assumed homogenous. This 
technique cannot be adopted for our model because of its restrictive nature.  
The fixed effect method allows us to use different constants for each firm in our 
study. We have limited cross-sectional units of 14 in our study which makes the use of 
this technique more desirable. Random effect method on the other hand is simpler to 
estimate. Random effect technique assumes that the variability in the constant term 
across firms is random with a zero mean. Thus, its effect can be separated as an error 
term for individual firms. 
Our fixed effect model can be written as 
𝐿𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡 
Whereas, random effect assumes the constant term 𝛼 as 
    𝛼𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝑣𝑖 
Incorporating this fact into our model we get the Random Effect Model  
𝐿𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑔𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 +( 𝑣𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡) 
To decide between the two techniques, we have used Hausman test. The results are 
as follows 
 
Table 3: Correlated Random Test. Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects       
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 5.845172 4 0.211 
 
The Null hypothesis has been here that the Beta’s estimated by the efficient random 
effect technique are similar to the consistent estimates of fixed effect. We reject the null 
hypothesis here for the efficient random effect technique. Thus, the coefficients 
estimated through the random effects are derived as in Table 4. 
Based on the results it can be stated that growth and size of firm has no significant 
effect on leverage of the firm. Profitability on the other hand shows the strongest 
relation. More profitable a firm is, less likely it is to be levered. It is because firms have 
enough resources of internal finances available to them. Thus, pecking order theory is 
best in explaining this variation. However, we do not have significant evidence to reject 
Trade-Off theory and Agency Cost theory as well. All the three theories go together on 




the explanation of tangibility. Only those firms with more tangible assets can afford 
more debt. There has been a positive relationship detected between leverage and 
tangibility of the firm. It has also been observed from financial statements of these firms 
that all secured debts are also on the condition that they must maintain a certain level 
of leverage. Thus, implying that agency cost of debt is in work. 
Table 4. Random Effect Regression Analysis 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.281828 0.143276 1.967025 0.0505 
TG 0.283023 0.078638 3.599079 0.0004 
PR -0.763413 0.097399 -7.837983 0 
SZ 0.00679 0.00774 0.877209 0.3814 
GR 0.069867 0.057628 1.212375 0.2268 
R-squared   0.29       
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we aim to understand the behavior cement industry of Pakistan 
regarding its capital structure. One of the objectives is to understand how leverage is 
behaving over time. It is found from this study that leverage is decreasing overtime. 
The possible explanation for this decrease is that firms have become profitable over 
time and hence reduce the need for external financing. Also, those firms that are 
financing externally have been restricted by the availability of tangible assets and also 
by financial institutions providing that loan. We also checked four determinants of the 
leverage known as profitability, tangibility, size of firm and growth of firm. Since firms 
were mostly profitable they had lesser need for external financing. However, those 
firms which needed funds had collateralized their tangible assets along with restrictions 
on leverage. Consequently, it is safe to say that tangibility has a direct relation with 
leverage and that agency cost of debt also explains some of the variation in our 
concerned dependent variable.   In the light of these determinants we tested hypothesis 
of three seemingly competing theories of capital structure known as pecking order 
theory, trade-off theory and agency cost theory. While we found out that pecking order 
theory was best in explaining most of the variation in leverages there is no clear-cut 
evidence of rejecting the other theories. Especially when restrictive loans are in work 
where firms are supposed to maintain certain level of leverage, agency cost of debt 
cannot be ignored. It is most probable that all these three theories do work at the same 
time and managers while deciding on financing go through a complex thought process 




involving all such factors. We failed to observe significant relationship of size and 
growth either because firm size and the rate at which it grows does not matters in 
cement sector, or each firm respond differently to these changes. This fact however can 
be observed upon further investigation on the matter.  
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